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Abstract
What if there was a way to detect undeclared (Clandestine) facilities using
data sets from a nuclear facility? The Statistical Modeling and Experimental
Design group at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are developing the
Modeling and Inference for Remote Sensing (MIRS) model. The model uses
two deterrence scenarios within the nuclear fuel cycle to detect undeclared
facilities. The two scenarios are used in an agent based nuclear fuel cycle
simulator to produce the declared and undeclared feed, tails assay, and sink
inventory in kilograms of Uranium. From the simulations ran, detection of
diverted uranium can be seen easily in the declared sink inventory graph of
scenario 2. However, there are cases in scenario 1 where detection of uranium
is hard to detect. Deeper parametric search needs to be conducted in order to
assess detection in the declared sink inventory in scenario 1.
Future Work
Results of M.I.R.S. Simulation
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Cyclus Simulation Variables
Diagram 1(above): The enrichment archetype is displayed with the original
values for each scenario used in the agent based fuel cycle simulator.
Flowchart 1(above): A representation of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Plot 2 - Parameter change in the undeclared enrichment facility: Using 
the range from [50000, 80000] with increments of 10000, diversion is seen 
in fuel in the declared sink inventory. 
Plot 4 - Parameter change in the SWU capacity of the undeclared 
enrichment facility: Using the range from [665, 680] with increments of 5, 
there is divergence seen in the declared sink inventory graph. 
Deeper parametric search needs to be conducted in order to assess detection
in the declared sink inventory in scenario 1. Once completed, machine
learning time series classification algorithms will be implemented to classify
declared and undeclared enrichment facilities.
Table 1(above): The range tested in each variable is in kilograms of uranium.
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Diagram 2(above): Machine learning classification algorithms currently within
consideration.
Plot 1 - Parameter change in the undeclared enrichment facility: Using 
the range from [60000, 61500] with increments of 500, there is a dip in the 
enrichment feed inventory graph which signifies diversion of uranium. 
Plot 3 - Parameter change in the SWU capacity of the undeclared 
enrichment facility: Using the range from [635, 650] with increments of 5, 
it is difficult to detect diversion in the declared sink inventory graph. 
However, divergence still occurs and can be seen in the undeclared facility 
graphs. 
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2Note: ND = No Diversion     D = Diversion*The first run in the legend is the original value in the scenario.
Sensitivity analysis on maximum feed inventory.
Model
Scenario 1:
• Diversion is observed when there is a decrease in the declared sink
inventory.
• Divergence is difficult to assess with the current parameter changes
done.
• More work needs to be done to assess what parameters in the declared
sink facility can reflect divergence in the model.
Scenario 2: 
• The declared sink inventory successfully captures divergence from the
declared sink inventory.
• We observed a line “stair” step behavior.
• That behavior reflects the inventory increasing and decreasing as time
progresses sending material to the undeclared enrichment feed
inventory.
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